| The design and management of reward systems | | | | answer or objective solution to what or how |
| present the general manager with one of the most | | | | someone should be paid. What people will accept, be |
| difficult HRM tasks. This HRM policy area contains the | | | | motivated by, or perceive as fair is highly subjective. |
| greatest contradictions between the promise of | | | | Pay is a matter of perceptions and values that often |
| theory and the reality of implementation. | | | | generate conflict. |
| Consequently, organizations sometimes go through | | | | Management’s influence on attitudes toward |
| cycles of innovation and hope as reward systems are | | | | money |
| developed, followed by disillusionment as these | | | | Many organizations are caught up in a vicious cycle |
| reward systems fail to deliver. | | | | that they partly create. Firms often emphasize |
| Rewards and employee satisfaction | | | | compensation levels and a belief in individual pay for |
| Gaining an employee’s satisfaction with the | | | | performance in their recruitment and internal |
| rewards given is not a simple matter. Rather, it is a | | | | communications. This is likely to attract people with |
| function of several factors that organizations must | | | | high needs for money as well as to heighten that |
| learn to manage: | | | | need in those already employed. Thus, the meaning |
| 1. The individual’s satisfaction with rewards is, in | | | | employees attach to money is partly shaped by |
| part, related to what is expected and how much is | | | | management’s views. If merit increases, |
| received. Feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction | | | | bonuses, stock options, and perquisites are held out |
| arise when individuals compare their input - job skills, | | | | as valued symbols of recognition and success, |
| education, effort, and performance - to output - the | | | | employees will come to see them in this light even |
| mix of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards they receive. | | | | more than they might have perceived them at first. |
| 2. Employee satisfaction is also affected by | | | | Having heightened money’s importance as a |
| comparisons with other people in similar jobs and | | | | reward, management must then respond to |
| organizations. In effect, employees compare their | | | | employees who may demand more money or better |
| own input/output ratio with that of others. People | | | | pay-for-performance systems. |
| vary considerably in how they weigh various inputs in | | | | Firms must establish a philosophy about rewards and |
| that comparison. They tend to weigh their strong | | | | the role of pay in the mix of rewards. Without such |
| points more heavily, such as certain skills or a recent | | | | a philosophy, the compensation practices that happen |
| incident of effective performance. Individuals also | | | | to be in place, for the reasons already stated, will |
| tend to overrate their own performance compared | | | | continue to shape employees’ satisfactions, and |
| with the rating they receive from their supervisors. | | | | those expectations will sustain the existing practices. |
| The problem of unrealistic self-rating exists partly | | | | If money has been emphasized as an important |
| because supervisors in most organizations do not | | | | symbol of success, that emphasis will continue even |
| communicate a candid evaluation of their | | | | though a compensation system with a slightly |
| subordinates’ performance to them. Such candid | | | | different emphasis might have equal motivational |
| communication to subordinates, unless done skillfully, | | | | value with fewer administrative problems and |
| seriously risks damaging their self-esteem. The bigger | | | | perhaps even lower cost. Money is important, but its |
| dilemma, however, is that failure by managers to | | | | degree of importance is influenced by the type of |
| communicate a candid appraisal of performance | | | | compensation system and philosophy that |
| makes it difficult for employees to develop a realistic | | | | management adopts. |
| view of their own performance, thus increasing the | | | | Pay for performance |
| possibility of dissatisfaction with the pay they are | | | | Some reasons why organizations pay their |
| receiving. | | | | employees for performance are as follows:under the |
| 3. Employees often misperceive the rewards of | | | | right conditions, a pay-for-performance system can |
| others; their misperception can cause the employees | | | | motivate desired behavior.a pay-for-performance |
| to become dissatisfied. Evidence shows that | | | | system can help attract and keep |
| individuals tend to overestimate the pay of fellow | | | | achievement-oriented individuals.a |
| workers doing similar jobs and to underestimate their | | | | pay-for-performance system can help to retain good |
| performance (a defense of self-esteem-building | | | | performers while discouraging the poor performers. |
| mechanism). Misperceptions of the performance and | | | | In the US, at least, many employees, both managers |
| rewards of others also occur because organizations | | | | and workers, prefer a pay-for-performance system, |
| do not generally make available accurate information | | | | although white-collar workers are significantly more |
| about the salary or performance of others. | | | | supportive of the notion than blue-collar workers. |
| 4. Finally, overall satisfaction results from a mix of | | | | But there is a gap, and the evidence indicates a wide |
| rewards rather than from any single reward. The | | | | gap, between the desire to devise a |
| evidence suggests that intrinsic rewards and extrinsic | | | | pay-for-performance system and the ability to make |
| rewards are both important and that they cannot be | | | | such a system work. |
| directly substituted for each other. Employees who | | | | The most important distinction among various |
| are paid well for repetitious, boring work will be | | | | pay-for-performance systems is the level of |
| dissatisfied with the lack of intrinsic rewards, just as | | | | aggregation at which performance is defined - |
| employees paid poorly for interesting, challenging | | | | individual, group, and organizationwide. Several |
| work may be dissatisfied with extrinsic rewards. | | | | pay-for-performance systems are summarized in the |
| | | | exhibit that follows. |
| | | | Historically, pay for performance has meant pay for |
| Rewards and motivation | | | | individual performance. Piece-rate incentive systems |
| From the organization’s point of view, rewards | | | | for production employees and merit salary increases |
| are intended to motivate certain behaviors. But under | | | | or bonus plans for salaried employees have been the |
| what conditions will rewards actually motivate | | | | dominant means of paying for performance. In the |
| employees? To be useful, rewards must be seen as | | | | last decade, piece-rate incentive systems have |
| timely and tied to effective performance. | | | | dramatically declined because managers have |
| One theory suggests that the following conditions are | | | | discovered that such systems result in dysfunctional |
| necessary for employee motivation. | | | | behavior, such as low cooperation, artificial limits on |
| 1. Employees must believe effective performance (or | | | | production and resistance to changing standards. |
| certain specified behavior) will lead to certain rewards. | | | | Similarly, more questions are being asked about |
| For example, attaining certain results will lead to a | | | | individual bonus plans for executives as top managers |
| bonus or approval from others. | | | | discovered their negative effects. |
| 2. Employees must feel that the rewards offered are | | | | Meanwhile, organizationwide incentive systems are |
| attractive. Some employees may desire promotions | | | | becoming more popular, particularly because |
| because they seek power, but others may want a | | | | managers are finding that they foster cooperation, |
| fringe benefit, such as a pension, because they are | | | | which leads to productivity and innovation. To |
| older and want retirement security. | | | | succeed, however, these plans require certain |
| 3. Employees must believe a certain level of individual | | | | conditions. A review of the key considerations for |
| effort will lead to achieving the corporation’s | | | | designing a pay-for-performance plan and a discussion |
| standards of performance. | | | | of the problems that arise when these considerations |
| As indicated, motivation to exert effort is triggered | | | | are not observed follow. |
| by the prospect of desired rewards: money, | | | | Individual pay for performance. The design of an |
| recognition, promotion, and so forth. If effort leads | | | | individual pay-for performance system requires an |
| to performance and performance leads to desired | | | | analysis of the task. Does the individual have control |
| rewards, the employee is satisfied and motivated to | | | | over the performance (result) that is to be |
| perform again. | | | | measured? Is there a significant |
| As mentioned above, rewards fall into two | | | | effort-to-performance relationship? For motivational |
| categories: extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic rewards | | | | reasons already discussed such a relationship must |
| come from the organization as money, perquisites, or | | | | exist. Unfortunately, many individual bonus, |
| promotions or from supervisors and coworkers as | | | | commission, or piece-rate incentive plans fall short in |
| recognition. Intrinsic rewards accrue from performing | | | | meeting this requirement. An individual may not have |
| the task itself, and may include the satisfaction of | | | | control over a performance result, such as sales or |
| accomplishment or a sense of influence. The process | | | | profit, because that result is affected by economic |
| of work and the individual’s response to it | | | | cycles or competitive forces beyond his or her |
| provide the intrinsic rewards. But the organization | | | | control. Indeed, there are few outcomes in complex |
| seeking to increase intrinsic rewards must provide a | | | | organizations that are not dependent on other |
| work environment that allows these satisfactions to | | | | functions or individuals, fewer still that are not |
| occur; therefore, more organizations are redesigning | | | | subject to external factors. |
| work and delegating responsibility to enhance | | | | Choosing an appropriate measure of performance on |
| employee involvement. | | | | which to base pay is a related problem incurred by |
| Equity and participation | | | | individual bonus plans. For reasons discussed earlier, |
| The ability of a reward system both to motivate and | | | | effectiveness on a job can include many facets not |
| to satisfy depends on who influences and/or controls | | | | captured by cost, units produced, or sales revenues. |
| the system’s design and implementation. Even | | | | Failure to include all activities that are important for |
| though considerable evidence suggests that | | | | effectiveness can lead to negative consequences. For |
| participation in decision making can lead to greater | | | | example, sales personnel who receive a bonus for |
| acceptance of decisions, participation in the design | | | | sales volume may push unneeded products, thus |
| and administration of reward systems is rare. Such | | | | damaging long-term customer relations, or they may |
| participation is time-consuming. | | | | push an unprofitable mix of products just to increase |
| Perhaps, a greater roadblock is that pay has been of | | | | volume. These same salespeople may also take |
| the last strongholds of managerial prerogatives. | | | | orders and make commitments that cannot be met |
| Concerned about employee self-interest and | | | | by manufacturing. Instead, why not hold salespeople |
| compensation costs, corporations do not typically | | | | responsible for profits, a more inclusive measure of |
| allow employees to participate in pay-system design | | | | performance? The obvious problem with this |
| or decisions. Thus, it is not possible to test thoroughly | | | | measure is that sales personnel do not have control |
| the effects of widespread participation on | | | | over profits. |
| acceptance of and trust in reward system. | | | | These dilemmas constantly encountered and have led |
| Compensation systems: the dilemmas of practice | | | | to the use of more subjective but inclusive behavioral |
| A body of experience, research and theory has been | | | | measures of performance. Why not observe if the |
| developed about how money satisfies and motivates | | | | salesperson or executive is performing all aspects of |
| employees. Virtually every study on the importance | | | | the job well? More merit salary increases are based |
| of pay compared with other potential rewards has | | | | on subjective judgments and so are some individual |
| shown that pay is important. It consistently ranks | | | | bonus plans. Subjective evaluation systems though |
| among the top five rewards. The importance of pay | | | | they can be all-inclusive if based on a thorough |
| and other rewards, however, is affected by many | | | | analysis of the job, require deep trust in |
| factors. Money, for example, is likely to be viewed | | | | management, good manager-subordinate relations, |
| differently at various points in one’s career, | | | | and effective interpersonal skills. Unfortunately, these |
| because the need for money versus other rewards | | | | conditions are not fully met in many situations, though |
| (status, growth, security, and so forth) changes at | | | | they can be developed if judged to be sufficiently |
| each stage. National culture is another important | | | | important. |
| factor. American managers and employees apparently | | | | Group and organizationwide pay plans. Organizational |
| emphasize pay for individual performance more than | | | | effectiveness depends on employee cooperation in |
| do their European or Japanese counterparts. | | | | most instances. An organization may elect to tie pay, |
| European and Japanese companies, however, rely | | | | or at least some portion of pay, indirectly to individual |
| more on slow promotions and seniority as well as | | | | performance. Seeking to foster team-work, a |
| some degree of employment security. Even within a | | | | company may tie an incentive to some measure of |
| single culture, shifting national forces may alter | | | | group performance, or it may offer some type of |
| people’s needs for money versus other rewards. | | | | profits or productivity-sharing plan for the whole plant |
| Companies have developed various compensation | | | | or company. |
| systems and practices to achieve pay satisfaction | | | | Gains-sharing plans have been used for years in many |
| and motivation. In manufacturing firms, payroll costs | | | | varieties. The real power of a gains-sharing plan |
| can run as high as 40% of sales revenues, whereas | | | | comes when it is supported by a climate of |
| in service organizations payroll costs can top 70%. | | | | participation. Various structures, systems, and |
| General managers, therefore, take an understandable | | | | processes involve employees in decisions that |
| interest in payroll costs and how this money is spent. | | | | improve the organization’s performance and |
| The traditional view of managers and compensation | | | | result in a bonus throughout the organization. |
| specialists is that if the right system can be | | | | Bibliography |
| developed, it will solve most problems. This is not a | | | | Searle, John G. |
| plausible assumption, because, there is no one right | | | | |